Abstract. On-Line Authenticated Encryption (OAE) combines privacy with data integrity and is on-line computable. Most block cipher-based schemes for Authenticated Encryption can be run on-line and are provably secure against nonce-respecting adversaries. But they fail badly for more general adversaries. This is not a theoretical observation only -in practice, the reuse of nonces is a frequent issue
. Classification of provably secure block cipher-based AE Schemes. CCM and SSH-CTR are considered offline because encryption requires prior knowledge of the message length. Note that the family of McOE schemes, because of being on-line, satisfies a slightly weaker security definition against nonce-reusing adversaries than SIV, HBS, and BTM.
In theory, the concept of a nonce is simple. In practice, it is challenging to ensure that a nonce is never reused. Flawed implementations of nonces are ubiquitous [10, 20, 28, 46, 47] . Apart from implementation failures, there are fundamental reasons why software developers cannot always prevent nonce-reuse. A persistently stored counter, which is increased and written back each time a new nonce is needed, may be reseted by a backup -usually after some previous data loss. Similarly, the internal and persistent state of an application may be duplicated when a virtual machine is cloned, etc.
Related Work and Our Contribution. We aim to achieve both simultaneously: security against nonce-reusing adversaries (sometimes also called nonce-misusing adversaries) and support for on-line-encryption in terms of an AE scheme. Apart from generic composition (Encrypt-thenMac, EtM), none of the ISO/IEC 19772:2009 schemes -in fact, no previously published AE scheme at all -achieves both of these goals, cf. Table 1 . In this table, we classify a vast variety of provably secure block cipher-based AE scheme with respect to their on-line-ability and against which adversaries (nonce-respecting versus -reusing) they are proven secure.
Since EtM is not a concrete scheme but merely a generic construction technique, there are some challenges left in order to make it full on-line secure: First, an appropriate on-line cipher has to be chosen. Second, a suitable, on-line computable, secure, and deterministic MAC must be selected. And, third, the EtM scheme requires at least two independent keys to be secure. Since two schemes are used in parallel, it is likely to squander resources in terms of run time and -important for hardware designers -in terms of space. Since EtM first has to be turned into an OAE scheme by making the appropriate choices, we do not include it in our analysis.
As it turned out, we actually found nonce-reuse attacks for all of those schemes, cf. Table  2 and Appendix A. In this paper we present a new family of on-line authenticated encryption schemes called McOE. The general structure is based on the Tweak Chain Hash (TCH) construction from [31] which is adepted from the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) construction [35] . We introduce three members of the McOE family -called McOE-X, McOE-D, McOE-G. Each of them is able to fill the gap in the upper-right of Table 1 . We argue that closing this gap is both practically relevant and theoretically interesting.
Initial Value (IV) based AE schemes which provide security against repeated IV's have been addressed by Rogaway and Shrimpton in [43] . Furthermore, they shaped the notion of "misuse resistance" and proposing SIV as a solution. SIV and related schemes (HBS [25] and BTM [24] ) actually provide excellent security against nonce-reusing adversaries, though there are other potential misuse cases, cf. Appendix A.3. Their main disadvantage is that they are inherently off-line: For encryption, one must either keep the entire plaintext in memory, or read the plaintext twice.
Ideally, an adversary seeing the encryptions of two (equal-length) plaintexts P 1 and P 2 cannot even decide if P 1 = P 2 or not. When using a nonce more than once, deciding about P 1 = P 2 is privacy authenticity attack workload attack workload CCFB [33] O(1) O(1) CCM [14] O(1) ≪ 2 (n/2) [15] CHM [22] O(1) O(1) CIP [23] O (1) O(1) CWC [29] O (1) O(1) EAX [7] O (1) O(1) GCM [34] O (1) O(1) IACBC [26] O (1) O (1) privacy authenticity attack workload attack workload IAPM [26] O(1) O(1) OCB1 [42] O(1) O(1) OCB2 [39] O(1) O(1) OCB3 [30] O (1) O(1) RPC [11] O (1) O(1) TAE [?] O (1) O(1) XCBC [17] O(2 n/4 ) ? Table 2 . Overview of our nonce-reuse attacks on published AE schemes, excluding SIV, HBS and BTM, which have been explicitly designed to resist nonce-reuse. Almost all attacks achieve an advantage close to 1. The "attack workload" covers the computational effort, amount of needed memory as well as the time complexity. Details are given in Appendix A.
easy. SIV and its relatives ensure that nothing else is feasible for nonce-reusing adversaries. In the case of on-line encryption, where the first few bits of the encryption of a lengthy message must not depend on the last few bits of that message, there is unavoidably something beyond P 1 = P 2 . The adversary can compare any two ciphertexts for their longest common prefix, and then conclude about common prefixes of the secret plaintexts. Our notion of misuse resistance means that this is all the adversary can gain. Even in the case of a nonce-reuse, the adversary 1. cannot do anything beyond determining the length of common plaintext prefixes and 2. the scheme still provides the usual level of authenticity for AE (INT-CTXT).
The first property is common for on-line ciphers/permutations (OPRP) [1] . Recently, [45] studies the design of on-line ciphers from tweakable block ciphers bearing some similarities to our approach, especially to TC3. In contrast to the McOE family, the constructions from [45] provide no authentication. The McOE schemes are, e.g., based on a normal block cipher or a tweakable block cipher.
Design Principles for AE Schemes. The question how to provide authenticated encryption (without stating that name) when given a secure on-line cipher is studied in [2] , the revised and full version of [1] . The first idea in [2] only provides security if all messages are of the same length. The second idea repairs that by prepending the message's length to the message, at the cost of being off-line, since the message length must be known at the beginning of the encryption process. The third idea is to prepend and append a random W to a message M and then to perform the on-line encryption of (W ||M ||W ). This looks promising, but the same W is used for two different purposes, putting different constraints on the generation of W . For privacy, it suffices that W behaves like a nonce, not requiring secrecy or unpredictability. Even if W is not a nonce, but the same W is used for the encryption of several messages, all the adversary can determine are the lengths of common plaintexts prefixes, as we required for nonce-reuse. On the other hand, authenticity actually assumes a secret or unpredictable W , rather than a nonce. If the adversary can guess W before choosing a message, she asks for the authenticated encryption of (M ||W ). Then she can predict the authenticated encryption of M without actually asking for it. The McOE family replaces the "random" W by a proper nonce and the key-dependent tag computation value τ , performing a nonce-dependent on-line encryption of (M ||τ ). The encryption can also depend on some associated data, which turns McOE into a family of schemes for OAEAD (On-Line Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data).
The generic McOE construction, where E denotes a tweakable block cipher.
Roadmap. In Section 2 we describe the basic design principle of McOE. Then we present the members of the McOE family. Furthermore, we introduce concret instances of those family, and provide performance data when instantiated with either AES-128 or Threefish-512 as the underlying block cipher. Section 3 deals with general notions and definitions, and Section 4 defines the security of OAE. The main result of the paper, the security proof of the generic McOE scheme and its analysis is presented in Section 5. In Sections 6, 7, and 8 we show the security of McOE-X, McOE-D, and McOE-G, respectively. The discussion in Section 9 concludes the paper. The appendix deals with misuse attacks against published AE schemes, and provides some proof supplements.
2 Practical On-Line Authenticated Encryption using AES and Threefish
Generic Construction of the McOE Family (without Tag-splitting)
Our design goal was to build a misuse-resistent on-line authenticated encryption scheme, which follows the on-line permutation approach discussed by Bellare et al. in [1] . Therefore, our generic McOE structure (see Figure 1 ) is based on TC3, which is an on-line encryption scheme presented by Rogaway and Zhan in [45] . Like TC3, our scheme is based on a tweakable block cipher -called E K -but is stateful regarding to the usage of a nonce. Additionally, we expanded it to a fullfledged authenticated encryption scheme with an additional effort of only two tweakable block cipher calls. We also introduce the tag-splitting (TS) method for processing messages whose length is not a multiple of the block length. Without TS, we would have to pad such messages and then encrypt the padded messages -resulting in an expanded ciphertext. TS is similar to a wellknown length preserving method called ciphertext stealing (CTS), e.g., [13] . Note, that CTS requires to process the last block before the last but one, which is not possible for McOE.
The encryption and decryption of the generic construction of McOE without TS can be described by the following two algorithms.
Definition 1 (Generic McOE Scheme without Tag-Splitting). Let Π = {K, E, D} be an authenticated encryption scheme, where K denotes the key derivation function, E the encryption function, and D the decryption function. Let E ∈ Block(n, n, n) be a tweakable block cipher. Furthermore, let H be the header with H ∈ D L H n , M be the message with M ∈ D L n for some integer L, T be the authentication tag with T ∈ D n , and C be the ciphertext with C ∈ D L n . Then E and D of the McOE family are given by the algorithms EncryptAuthenticate and DecryptAuthenticate, respectively. Here, the encryption function takes a header H and a message M returning a ciphertext C and a tag T . The decryption function takes a header H, a ciphertext C and a tag T and returns either a plaintext M or the fail symbol ⊥.
In the case when the header or the message length is not a multiple of the block size n, we recommend to use the secure 10 * -padding. Furthermore, the header has to consist of at least one block, since the tag computation value τ depends on it. Hence, the whole header can be seen as a nonce. To fulfill the requirement of length preserving encryption, we introduce the generic McOE scheme using the TS method in the next section.
Generic Construction of the McOE Family (Tag-splitting)
In Figure 2 you can see the generic McOE scheme when using Tag-splitting to provide length preserving. Both the encryption and decryption process can be seen in the following pseudocode. Note that the additional effort to generate the tag -in comparison to McOE without TS -is given by only one block cipher invocation (cf. line 7 and 9 in EncryptAuthenticateSplitTag and DecryptAuthenticateSplitTag, respectively).
Definition 2 (Generic McOE Scheme with Tag-Splitting). Let Π = {K, E, D} be an authenticated encryption scheme, where K denotes the key derivation function, E the encryption function, and D the decryption function. Let E ∈ Block(n, n, n) be a tweakable block cipher.
Furthermore, let H be the header with H ∈ D L H n , M be the message with M ∈ D L n ||{0, 1} l * for some integers L and l * , 0 < l * < n, T be the authentication tag with T ∈ D n , and C be the ciphertext with C ∈ D L n ||{0, 1} l * . Then, the tag-splitting variants of E and D are given by the algorithms EncryptAuthenticateSplitTag and DecryptAuthenticateSplitTag, respectively. Here, the encryption function takes a header H and a message M returning a ciphertext C and a tag T . The decryption function takes a header H, a ciphertext C and a tag T and returns either a plaintext M or the fail symbol ⊥.
Both schemes, with and without Tag-splitting, are secure in the common CCA setting assuming a nonce respecting adversary. In addition, they guarantee a certain amount of security in the nonce-misuse scenario, i.e., indistinguishability from an on-line permutation and secure against existential forgery attacks.
McOE-X
The first instance presented in this paper is called McOE-X, where the 'X' indicates the way of handling the tweak. This scheme uses an ordinary block cipher which is converted to a tweakable block cipher by XORing the tweak (i.e., the chaining value) to the key K. A depiction of this instance is given in Figure 3 .
The none tag-splitting and tag-splitting modes of McOE-X can be described by the algorithms introduced in Section 2.1 (see Definition 1 and 2) where the tweakable block cipher E K is defined by
where E K is a common block cipher, e.g., AES, Serpent, or MARS. For performance testing we have implemented McOE-X using the block ciphers AES-128 and Threefish-512, resulting in the two practical instances McOE-X-AES and McOE-X-Threefish. Both implementations are easily extended to smoothly handle associated data, i.e., data that is not encrypted but only authenticated. The security proofs considering associated data are given in Section 6. E E Fig. 3 . The McOE-X encryption process. In case that the message length is not a multiple of the block size, McOE-X performs tag-splitting (upper variant). Otherwise, the tag can be computed without splitting (lower variant). The key used for the block cipher E is computed by the injective function K ⊕ U which is given the secret key K and the chaining value input U . The tag returned is the n-bit value T . The n − l-bit value Z is discarded. The decryption process works in a similar way from 'left to right' only the block cipher component E is replaced by its counterpart E −1 apart from one exception: the first call computes τ .
The choice of Threefish-512 is based on two facts. First, it contains a really agile key scheduler, since it is optimized for hashing messages in the MMO (Matyas-Meyer-Oseas) mode. Second, it processes message blocks of size 512 bit, which results in less frequent incovations of the block cipher E K .
Remark. For this instance of the McOE family we do need related key resistance for the block cipher E since the adversary can 'partially control' some relations among keys used in the computation. We need this requirement only for McOE-X and not for the two instances introduced in the next sections.
McOE-D
In this section we present another member of the McOE family -called McOE-D. This scheme invokes the block cipher E twice for processing one message block (see Figure 4) . The tweakable block cipher E K is defined as follows
where E K denotes a common block cipher, M the message, and U (chaining value) the tweak. To get rid of the key relation issue we used the double invocation technique (i.e., the block cipher E K is called twice) introduced by Liskov et al. in [31] . This implies that the key scheduler is only applied at the beginning and not for every message block as in McOE-X. So the additional effort compared to McOE-X is only the difference between the computation effort of the key scheduler and a block cipher call.
For this member of the McOE family we also present a version realizing the tag-splitting approach, which was introduced before (see Section 6). 
. Else, the tag can be computed without splitting (lower variant). The key used for the block cipher E is the same for every encryption. Hence, it can be precomputed. The tag returned is the n-bit value T . The n − l-bit value Z is discarded. The decryption process works in a similar way from 'left to right' only the block cipher component E is replaced by its counterpart E −1 apart from one exception: the first call computes τ .
The McOE-G scheme can be easily extended to smoothly handle associated data, i.e., data that is not encrypted but only authenticated. The security proofs considering associated data are given in Section 8.
Benchmarking
This section is about measuring the performance of all three presented members of the McOE family. The reference values are given by the CBC encryption scheme. Note, that the implementation of the CBC mode does not contain authentication. The results of our naive implementation based on common reference code are illustrated in Table 3 . Table 3 . Performance values (cycles-per-byte, single core), measured on a Core i5 540M for AES-128 and Threefish-512. McOE-X is the main contribution in the current paper, McOE-D invokes the underlying block cipher twice and McOE-G uses Galois field arithmetic. For a comparsion, we also provide the performance of unauthenticated AES-CBC. The AES software implementation is based on Gladman [16] , whereas the hardware implementation is based on the Intel AES-NI Sample Library [12] . The Threefish implementation is based on the NIST/SHA-3 reference source as provided by the Skein authors [36] . Finally, the implementation of Galois field NI multiplication (GF-NI) is based on the example-code from [19] .
On-Line Authenticated Encryption and Related Notions

Definitions
Length of Longest Common Prefix (LLCP n ). The length of a string x ∈ {0, 1} n is denoted by |x| := n. For integers n, ℓ, d
n and R ∈ D r n , we define the length of the longest common n-prefix of P and R as
For a non-empty set Q of strings in D * n we define LLCP n (Q, P ) as max
For convenience, we introduce a notation for a restriction on a set.
as the restriction of Q to B and C. This generalizes in the obvious way.
Game Based Proofs. Most of the proofs in this paper use the concept of game playing proofs. The presented games in this paper are written in a language heavily based on L, that was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in [5] . A game has three kinds of functions: An initialization function Initialize, a finalization function Finalize, and oracle functions. Any adversary A that is playing a game calls at first the Initialize function. In the following, A then makes some oracle queries and finally it ends the game by invoking Finalize. For adversaries, a function of a game is a black box. They have no access to any local or global variable of any game. An adversary wins the game if and only if Finalize returns true. We denote Pr[A G ⇒ 1] as the probability that the adversary wins the game G. Note, in this paper we usually use a three digit line number which follows the notation of Bellare and Rogaway where the first digit denotes the Game, e.g., 444 denotes the 44-th line of Game G 4 .
Block Ciphers and On-Line Permutations
Block Cipher. A (k, n) block cipher is a keyed family of permutations consisting of two paired algorithms E :
We follow the usual convention to write oracles, that are provided to an algorithm, as superscripts. We define the related key PRP-security of a block cipher E by the success probability of an adversary trying to differentiate between the block cipher and a random permutation.
fixed related key adversary A has access to an E oracle with two parameters such that she can query either
Let Perm(n, n) be the set of n-bit permutations such that the first parameter models the permutation and the second parameter the value that is to be permuted, i.e., for π ∈ Perm(n, n) it holds that π(Z, ·) is a random permutation for any given value of Z.
. Lazy sampling implementation of a stateful (n-)on-line permutation. In line 2, the Oracle LLCP * n is invoked returning (j, p) where p denotes the length of the prefix n determined via LLCPn and j denotes the index in Q |V,M . In line 5, we denote by C j i the i-th n-bit block of the j-th entry in Q |C .
The related-key (RK) advantage [32] of A in breaking E is then defined as
Tweakable Block Cipher The concept of a tweakable block ciphers was introduced by Liskov et al. in [31] . The design is based on a common block cipher, which is extended by a so called tweak. A tweakable (k, v, n) block cipher is a family of functions consisting of two paired algo-
Definition 4. Let E ∈ Block(k, v, n) and denote by E −1 the corresponding inverse. A fixed adversary A has access to an E oracle with three parameters such that she can query either
Let TPerm(v, n) be the set of n-bit permutations such that the first parameter models the permutation and the second parameter the value that is to be permuted, i.e., for π ∈ TPerm(v, n) it holds that π(Z, ·) is a random permutation for any given value of Z.
The advantage for an adversary A to distinguish E from a randomly chosen permutation from TPerm(v, n) is defined as
On-Line Permutation (OPerm). We aim for larger permutations that not only permute single blocks but can handle multiple/variable block messages. Such a permutation, from D * n to D * n , is (n-)on-line if the i-th block of the output is determined completely by the first i blocks of the input. Let denote OPerm n, * the set of all on-line permutations from D * n to D * n . It is easy to extend the definition with a state space D v . Let OPerm v n, * denote the set of all functions from
is an (n-)on-line permutation. Figure 6 illustrates a lazy sampling implementation of OPerm v n, * . Next, we introduce the formal definition of a family of (n-)on-line functions which is the basic design principle of the McOE family.
is (n-)on-line if for any instance of this family determined by K, V , F (K, V, ·) is a permutation and there exists for any message
where "||" being the concatenation of strings, holds.
An encryption scheme is (n-)on-line if the encryption function is (n-)on-line. A thorough discussion of on-line encryption and its properties can be found in [1] .
The proof is similar to Proposition 3.4 of [1] .
Let F be a family of (n-)on-line functions. Assume that for each uniform randomly chosen
is a PRP, then it is easy to see that F K is indistinguishable from the OPerm oracle as shown in Figure 6 . We call such a a family of (n-)on-line functions on-line pseudo random permutations (OPRP).
Authenticated Encryption (With Associated Data)
An authenticated encryption scheme is a tuple Π = (K, E, D). Its aim is to provide privacy and data integrity. The key generation function K takes no input and returns a randomly chosen key K from the key space, e.g., from D k . The encryption algorithm E and the decryption algorithm D are deterministic algorithms that map values from D k × D + n × D * n to a string or -if the input is invalid -the value ⊥. The header H consists either only of the initial value/nonce V ∈ D n (if no data is to be authenticated/checked in the encryption/decryption process) or is a combination of V and a value from D * n . So H ⊂ D + n in either case. For sake of convenience, we usually write
, where the message M is chosen from D * n , H ∈ D + n and a key from the key space. We require D H K (E H K (M )) = M for any possible K, M, H, and define the tag size for a message M ∈ D * n and header
We denote an authenticated encryption scheme with the requirement that the initial vector V is only used once in a nonce based scheme. Otherwise, we call such a scheme deterministic. Similarly, we call an adversary nonce-respecting (nr) if no nonce is used twice for any query. Otherwise, the adversary is called nonce-ignoring (ni).
Security Notions for On-Line Authenticated Encryption
Authenticated (On-Line) Encryption tries to achieve privacy and authenticity at the same time. Therefore we need security notions to handle this twofold goal. For AE, there have been notions and their relations introduced for deterministic [44] and nonce based [3, 4, 27, 38, 42 ] AE schemes. In order to have one convenient toolset of notions, we adopt the notion of CCA3 security suggested in [44] as a natural strengthening of CCA2 security.
We parameterize our definition in order to define different -but closely related -notions by explicitly stating whether we mean an on-line or off-line scheme, ω ∈ {ae, oae}, and stating the adversary behavior as either nonce-respecting or nonce-ignoring, ν ∈ {nr, ni}. 
The adversary's random-bits oracle, $ ae (·, ·) or $ oae (·, ·), returns on a query with header H ∈ D + n and plaintext X ∈ D * n a random string of length |E K (M )| which is either on-line or not, depending on the variable ω. The ⊥(·, ·) oracle returns ⊥ on every input. We assume wlog. that the adversary A never ask a query which answer is already known. It is easy to see that we can rewrite the term given in Definition 6 as
One can interpret (1) as the advantage that an adversary has on the integrity of the ciphertext and (2) as the advantage that an CPA adversary has on the privacy. Using this decomposition as a motivational starting point, we now define ciphertext integrity and what we mean by a CPA adversary on authenticated encryption schemes. From now on, our definitions are based on the game playing methodology. For example, we can restate Definition 6 using the game G CCA3 given in Figure 7 as
We denote Adv CCA3(ω,ν) Π (q, ℓ, t) as the maximum advantage over all CCA3(ω, ν) adversaries run in time at most t, ask a total maximum ofueries to E and D, and whose total query length is not more than ℓ blocks.
Privacy and Integrity Notions for Authenticated Encryption Schemes.
Similarly, we define the privacy and integrity of an authenticated (on-line) encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D) with header space D + n , message space D * n and tag-size function tag(H, M ) as follows. 
We denote Adv CP A(ω,ν) Π (q, t, ℓ) and Adv
INT-CTXT(ν) Π
(q, t, ℓ) as the maximum advantage over all CP A(ω, ν) resp. INT-CTXT(ν) adversaries run in time at most t, ask a total maximum ofueries to E and D, and whose total query length is not more than ℓ blocks.
CCA3 is equal to INT-CTXT plus CPA.
We now give a generalization of Theorem 3.2 from Bellare and Namprempre [3] . It simply states the equivalence of a scheme being CCA3 secure and both INT-CTXT and CPA secure (often denoted as IND-CPA secure). These statements hold in the on-line and off-line case. 
Furthermore, A c and A p run in time O(t) and both make at mostueries in each case.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Relations between PRP and OPRP.
Let us proceed from on-line authenticated encryption schemes in a common case, where we consider an adversary A to be nonce respecting and the regarded scheme to be CCA3 ae,nr secure. For such schemes it is desirable to obtain a certain level of security, even in a misuse scenario. Due to the nature of this scenario an on-line authenticated encryption scheme can solely be CCA3 oae,ni secure. Hence it is of great interest to determine the relation between these two security notions. 
Proof (Sketch). Let denote (V i , M i ) the i-th encryption query. For each V i , V j with i = j it holds true that V i = V j , since we assume a nonce respecting adversary. Consequently F K (V i , ·) and F K (V j , ·) are two independent PRPs, due to the fact that all f ℓ k (V ||X, ·) with X ∈ D ℓ−1 n are PRPs. This implies that F K (V, .) is a PRP.
⊓ ⊔ This Lemma shows that a CCA3 oae,ni secure on-line authenticated encryption scheme is also CCA3 ae,nr secure against nonce respecting adversaries.
Security of the Generic McOE Scheme
In this section, we analyse the security of the generic McOE scheme. We introduced this scheme by Definition 1 and 2 (cf.Section 2), which also provide the corresponding pseudocode. We show that McOE achieves our two-fold goal, by proofing that it guarantees a certain minimum, well defined security against a nonce-ignoring adversary. More formal, we show that McOE is CCA3 oae,ni secure, which implies that McOE is also fully secure against a nonce-respecting adversary, i.e., CCA3 ae,nr secure (cf. Section 4.3).
Security Analysis of McOE without Tag-Splitting
We now proceed to show the security of McOE. 
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 1 together with Lemmas 2 and 3. ⊓ ⊔
In the follwoing, for the sake of simplification, we provide an upper bound which is much easier to grasp than the original bound, but not as tight as the original bound given in the theorem above. 
Proof. Our bound is derived by game playing arguments. Consider games G 1 -G 3 of Figure 9 and a fixed adversary A asking at mostueries with a total length of at most ℓ blocks. The functions Initialize and Finalize are identical for all games in this proof. Lets denote G 0 as the Game INT-CTXT(ni) as defined in Figure 8 . Definition 8 states that
In 
Fig. 9. Games G1-G3 for the proof of Lemma 2. Game G3 contains the code in the box while G2 does not.
In lines 203 and 222, the LLCP n oracle is inquired. Finally, the variable bad is set to true if one of the if-conditions in lines 208, 214, 227, 233, or 238 is true. None of these modifications affect the values returned to the adversary and therefore
For our further discussion we require another game G 4 which is explained in more detail later in this proof 2 . It follows that
We now proceed to upper bound any of the three terms contained in (3) -in right to left order. The success probability of game G 3 does not differ from the success probability of G 2 unless a chaining value U occurs twice. In this case, the adversary must (1) either have 'found' a collision for E K (X, Y ) ⊕ Y , i.e., she stumbles over (X, Y ) and (2), must have found a preimage of 0 n , which is always the starting point of our chain. Note, the value 0 n is initially stored in the set B 1 . In both cases, the variable bad would have been set to true, and it follows by [9] that
.
We now describe the new game G 4 . It is equal to G 3 except that the tweakable block cipher E and its inverse E −1 are replaced by the functions EncryptBlock and DecryptBlock, which are modeled as a set of pseudo random permutations, where the index is given by the tweak. We assume that they are implemented via lazy sampling. More precisely, the call E K (X, Y ) is replaced by an invocation of EncryptBlock K (X, Y ) and the call E So, by definition of G 4 , we have
Finally, we have to upper bound the advantage for the adversary A to win the game G 4 . A can only win this game if the condition in line 238 (resp. 438 for game G 4 ) is true. As usual, we assume wlog. that A doesn't ask a question if the answer is already known which implies that (H, C, T ) ∈ Q |H,C,T . For our analysis we distinguish between three cases. So we formally adjust line 240 (i.e., choose as the tag computation operation either E or E −1 ) such that we always have enough randomness left for our result.
Case 1: H ∈ B 2 and U ∈ B.
Since we already have computed τ in the past, the chance of success is upper bounded by the probability Pr[ E −1 K (U, T ) = τ ] which can be upper bounded by 1/(2 n − (q + ℓ)). Case 2: H ∈ B 2 , and U ∈ B 1 .
Then the tagging operation uses a new tweak and therefore the output of E K (U, τ ) is uniformly distributed and the success probability is ≤ 1/2 n . Case 3: H ∈ B 2 and U ∈ B 1 .
The chance of success is upper bounded by Pr[ E −1 K (U, T ) = τ ] which can be upper bounded by 1/2 n . Note, the 'missing' fourth case has been explicitly excluded by line 240 (resp. 440). Since these three cases are mutually exclusive, we can upper bound the success probability forueries as
Our claim follows by adding up the individual bounds. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 3. Let Π = (K, E, D) be a McOE scheme as in Definition 1 (i) . Let q be the number of total queries an adversary A is allowed to ask and ℓ be an integer representing the total length of the queries to E and D. Then,
Proof. Our bound is derived by game playing arguments. Consider games G 1 and G 2 of Figure  12 . The functions Initialize and Finalize are identical for any of those games. At first we investigate the differences between the CP A(aoe, ni) game from Figure 7 and G 1 from Figure 12 . In G 1 we have replaced E by its definition of McOE, and $ w by an on-line encryption oracle OnlinePermutation (line 102) that just models a 'perfect' OPRP, i.e., for two plaintexts with an equal prefix it returns two ciphertexts that also share a prefix of the same length. We again assume this oracle to be implemented by lazy sampling. Then, set B collects all chaining values (lines 113 and 119) in order to intercept the occurrence of two equal chaining values which do lead to two equal tweaks for the encryption of a block.
In line 105, the oracle LLCP n is invoked returning the length of the longest common prefix of (H, M ) and Q |H,M .
Finally, the variable bad is set to true if (one of) the conditions of lines 111/211 or 117/217 hold. These changes do not affect the success probability of an adversary, because the output of the oracle remains unchanged. More precisely, the distribution of the output does not change. This means that
and therefore, by common game playing arguments -using a new game G 3 described shortly -,
The success probability of game G 2 does not differ from the success probability of G 1 unless a chaining value U occurs twice. In this case, the adversary must either have found a collision for E K (X, Y )⊕Y , i.e., she has found (X, Y ) and
or must have found a preimage of 0 n . In both cases, the variable bad would have been set to true, and it follows again by [9] that
The aforementioned new game G 3 is equal to the game G 2 except that the tweakable block cipher E and its inverse E −1 are replaced by the functions EncryptBlock and DecryptBlock, which are modeled as set of pseudo random permutations, where the index is given by the tweak. We assume that they are implemented via lazy sampling. More precisely, the call E K (X, Y ) is
119 B ← B ∪ U ; 120 return C ; Fig. 10 . Games G1 and G2 for the proof of Lemma 3. Game G2 contains the code in the box while G1 does not.
replaced by an invocation of EncryptBlock K (X, Y ) and the call E −1
is replaced by an invocation of DecryptBlock K (X, Y ). We now upper bound the difference between G 2 and G 3 . So, by definition of G 4 , we have
Finally, we have to upper bound the advantage for an adversary A to win the game G 3 . Since the U cannot collide and it is not possible to compute a preimage for any query, the algorithm for b = 0 is an OPRP, and therefore the success probability to win G 3 for any adversary is 0.5, i.e., she has no advantage in winning this game.
Our claim follows by adding up the individual bounds. ⊓ ⊔ Tag 
Security Analysis of McOE with
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 1 together with Lemmas 4 and 6. ⊓ ⊔
For the sake of simplification we provide an upper bound which is much easier to grasp than the original bound, but not as tight as the original bound given in the theorem above.
Corollary 2. Let assume that ℓ ≥ 35, ℓ ≥ q and the T-IND-CCA-advantage is at most δ for an adversary which amount of queries is at most q + ℓ and its running time is O(t). Then the following bound holds
3 F i n a l i z e ( ) 4 return win ;
and (H, C) ∈ Q |H,C ) then
and (H, C) ∈ Q |H,C ) then 
Lemma 4. Let Π = (K, E, D) be a McOE scheme as in Definition 1 (ii)
. Let q ≤ 2 n/2−2 be the number of total queries an adversary A is allowed to ask and ℓ be an integer representing the total length in blocks of the queries to E and D. Then,
Proof. Our bound is derived by game playing arguments. Consider games G 1 -G 3 of Figure 11 and a fixed adversary A asking at mostueries with a total length of at most ℓ blocks. The functions Initialize and Finalize are identical for all games in this proof. Lets denote G 0 as the Game INT-CTXT(ni) as defined in Figure 8 . Definition 8 states that
In G 1 , the encryption and verify placeholders are replaced by their generic McOE counterparts as of Definition 1. We now discuss the differences between G 1 and G 2 . The set B is initialized with {0 n , 1 n } and then collects all new key-input values U which are computed during the encryption or verification process (in lines 209, 215, 227, 240, 246, and 258). Furthermore, the sets A[U ] collect the masked values of M * (cf. lines 220 and 252) for a certain prefix.
In lines 202 and 233, the LLCP n oracle is inquired. Finally, the variable bad is set to true if one of the if-conditions in lines 207, 213, 218, 225, 238, 244, 249 or 256 hold. None of these modifications affect the values returned to the adversary and therefore
For our further discussion we require another game G 4 which is explained in more detail later in this proof 3 . It follows that
We now proceed to upper bound any of the three terms contained in (4) -in right to left order. The success probability of game G 3 does not differ from the success probability of G 2 unless a chaining value U occurs twice. In this case, the adversary must (1) either have 'found' a collision for (2), must have found a preimage of 0 n or 1 n , which is always the starting point of our chain. Note, the values 0 n and 1 n are initially stored in the set B. In both cases, the variable bad would have been set to true. From [9] follows as upper bound
Furthermore, we have to consider the case when a collision occurs between the masked value of M * and the set A[U ]. As an adversary can askueries, it follows that the probability that the flag bad is set to true in lines 219 and 250 can be upper bounded by
By adding up both bounds it follows that
We now describe the new game G 4 . It is equal to G 3 except that the block cipher E and its inverse E −1 are replaced by the functions EncryptBlock and DecryptBlock, which are modeled as a set of pseudo random permutations, where the index is given by the tweak. We assume that they are implemented via lazy sampling. More precisely, the call E K (X, Y ) is replaced by an invocation of EncryptBlock K (X, Y ) and the call E −1
is replaced by an invocation of DecryptBlock K (X, Y ). We now upper bound the difference between G 3 and G 4 by
Finally, we have to upper bound the advantage for the adversary A to win the game G 4 . A can only win this game if the condition in lines 260-262 (resp. 460-462 for game G 4 ) holds. As usual, we assume wlog. that A does not ask a question if the answer is already known which implies that (H, C, T ) ∈ Q |H,C,T . We formally adjust lines 260-262 (i.e., choose as the tag computation operation either E or E −1 ) such that we always have enough randomness left for our result. For simple reference, we denote the last two chaining values as U L and U L+1 . For our analysis we distinguish between our two main cases. First, the case when |M L | = n, i.e., the size of the last message block is equal to the block size n. Second, the case when the size of the last message block M L is not equal to n.
Case 1:
In this case we first consider that U L ∈ B. This implies that (C 1 , . . . , C L ) must be part of a common prefix of a previous query. The adversary can only win if T is new, i.e., not a part of a previous occured prefix. The upper bound is then given by
we can upper bound the success probability for one query by 1/(2 n − q). Hence, forueries we can upper bound the success probability by q/(2 n − q). Case 2: Now we consider the case |M L | = n. It can be upper bounded by Lemma 5. The success probability is at most q/(2 n/2 − q).
Since both cases are mutually exclusive, we can upper bound the success probability forueries by q 2 n/2 − q . Case 1: U L+1 ∈ B This case implies that (C 1 , ..., C L , T α ) must be part of a common prefix from a previous query, otherwise this would imply a collison of the chaining value which is already handled by setting the flag bad to true in game G 2 (cf. line 248 of Figure 4) . Hence, the adversary can only win if T β is new, i.e., not a part of a previous occured prefix. The upper bound is given by max
∈ B This case implies that C L ||T α must be new. The probability that the condition from line 260 holds -forueries -can be upper bounded by
Hence, the probability forueries can be upper bound by
From the assumption U L+1 / ∈ B follows that U L+1 is new. Since E is a PRP, we can upper bound the probability that the condition from line 452 holds by
Then, the probability forueries can be upper bound by q/(2 |C L | − q). The success probability of this case depends on the length of |C L |. So we can distinguish between the following three subcases. Subcase 2.1:
In this case, we can upper bound Pr α by 1 2 n/2 −q and Pr β by 1. Hence the total success probability forueries is at most
In this case, we can upper bound Pr α by 2 2 n/2 −2q and Pr β by 1 2 n/2 −q . Hence the total success probability forueries is at most
In this case, we can upper bound Pr α by 1 and Pr β by 1 2 n/2+1 −q . Hence the total success probability forueries is at most
Since all three subcases are mutually exclusive, we can upper bound the success probability for q ≤ 2 n/2−2 queries by max q 2 n/2 − q ,
Due to the fact that Case 1 and Case 2 are mutually exclusive, we can upper bound the success probability forueries by max 0, q 2 n/2 − q ≤ q 2 n/2 − q .
Our claim follows by adding up the individual bounds. ⊓ ⊔ 
Proof. At first we investigate the differences between the CP A(aoe, ni) game from Figure 7 and G 1 from Figure 12 . In G 1 we have replaced E by its definition of McOE, and $ w by an on-line encryption oracle OPerm (line 102) that just models a 'perfect' OPRP, i.e., for two plaintexts with an equal prefix it returns two ciphertexts that also share a prefix of the same length. We again assume this oracle to be implemented by lazy sampling. Then, set B collects all chaining values (lines 113 and 119) in order to intercept the occurrence of two equal chaining values which do lead to two equal tweaks for the encryption of a block. The sets A[U ] collect all values of masked M * for specific chaining values U (line 124).
Finally, the variable bad is set to true if (one of) the conditions of lines 111/211, 117/217 or 122/222 holds. These changes do not affect the success probability of an adversary, because the output of the oracle remains unchanged. More precisely, the distribution of the output does not change. This means that
and therefore, by common game playing arguments -using a new game G 3 described shortly -
The success probability of game G 2 does not differ from the success probability of G 1 unless (1) a chaining value U occurs twice or (2) a collision between two masked values M * -sharing the same chaining value U -occurs.
In the first case, the adversary must either have found a collision for
found a preimage of 0 n or 1 n . In these cases, the variable bad would have been set to true, and it follows again by [9] that
In the second case, an adversary can askueries, and it follows that the probability for the flag bad is set to true in line 123 can be upper bounded by q(q + 1) 2 n − q .
By adding up both bounds follows
Fig. 12. Games G1 and G2 for the proof of Lemma 3. Game G2 contains the code in the box while G1 does not.
The aforementioned new game G 3 is equal to the game G 2 except that the block cipher E and its inverse E −1 are replaced by randomly chosen functions EncryptBlock and DecryptBlock, which are modeled as pseudo random permutations . We assume that they are implemented via lazy sampling. More precisely, the call E K (X) is replaced by an invocation of EncryptBlock K (X) and the call E −1 K (X) is replaced by an invocation of DecryptBlock K (X). We now upper bound the difference between G 2 and G 3 . So, by definition of G 4 , we have
Finally, we have to upper bound the advantage for an adversary A to win the game G 3 . Since U cannot collide and it is not possible to compute a preimage for any query, the algorithm for b = 0 is an OPRP, and therefore the success probability to win G 3 for any adversary is 0.5, i.e., she has no advantage in winning this game. 
with E ∈ Block(n, n) and ϕ is an injective function. Furthermore, the amount of queries an adversary is allowed to ask is at most 2 n/2−2 . Then, the upper bounds for the variants with and without using the Tag-Splitting method are as follows.
(i) Security without Tag-Splitting.
(ii) Security with Tag-Splitting.
Proof. The proofs of (i) and (ii) follow from Theorem 
with E ∈ Block(n, n) and ϕ is an injective function. Furthermore, the amount of queries an adversary is allowed to ask is at most 2 n/2−6 . Then, the upper bounds for the variants with and without using the Tag-Splitting method are as follows.
Adv
CCA3(oae,ni) Π (q, ℓ, t) ≤ 3(q + ℓ)(q + ℓ + 1) + 4q + 3ℓ 2 n − (q + ℓ)
+ 3 2Adv
CCA-PRP E,E −1 (2q + ℓ, O(t)) + 8(2q + ℓ) 2 + 2(2q + ℓ) 2 n − (2q + ℓ)
Adv
CCA3(oae,ni) Π (q, ℓ, t) ≤ 4(q + ℓ + 2)(q + ℓ + 3) + 6(2q + ℓ) 2 n − (q + ℓ) + 3q(q + 1) 2 n − q + q 2 n/2 − q + 3 2Adv CCA-PRP E,E −1 (2q + ℓ, O(t)) + 8(2q + ℓ) 2 + 2(2q + ℓ) 2 n − (2q + ℓ)
Proof. The proofs of (i) and (ii) follow from Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Lemma 7. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 7. Let E ∈ Block(n, n). Lets define the tweakable block cipher E K as
where E K denotes a common block cipher, M the message, and U (chaining value) the tweak. Furthermore, the inverse of E K is defined by 
We use this result for the following security proof.
Theorem 6.
Let Π = (K, E, D) be a McOE-G scheme as in Definition 1 and 2 , where the tweakable block cipher E is given by
with E ∈ Block(n, n) and H is a family of ǫ-AXU hash functions. Furthermore, the amount of queries an adversary is allowed to ask is at most 2 n/2−2 . Then, the upper bounds for the variants with and without using the Tag-Splitting method are as follows.
(i) Security without Tag-Splitting. (q, ℓ, t) ≤ 4(q + ℓ + 2)(q + ℓ + 3) + 6(2q + ℓ) 2 n − (q + ℓ) + 3q(q + 1) 2 n − q + q 2 n/2 − q + 3 Adv CCA-PRP E,E −1 (2q + ℓ, O(t)) + 3ǫ(2q + ℓ) 2 Proof. The proofs of (i) and (ii) follow from Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and Equation 6 . ⊓ ⊔ Remark. McOE-G is not secure, if an adversary has oracle access to the internal building blocks, i.e., the block cipher E and the ǫ-AXU hash function H. This is shown by Black et al. in [8] . Hence, it is crucial that the adversary is only allowed to query the tweakable block cipher E and not one of its parts.
Discussion
New Challenges for Research. At this point of time, cryptographic research has developed an inpressive number of good schemes for encryption, authentication, and authenticated encryption. Many of these schemes have been proven secure under standard assumptions on the underlying primitives. In practice, however, such schemes are often used in a way that undermines security. Trying to design cryptosystems as "misuse resistant" as possible still stands as a challenge for cryptographers. Furthermore, our research seems to pose new challenges for the design of symmetric primitives. Ideally, we would like to implement McOE using a tweakable n-bit block cipher with n-bit tweaks, supporting fast random tweak changes. Due to the current lack of such a primitive, we designed McOE-X, which requires an ordindary n-bit block cipher being secure against XOR-related key attacks, and supporting fast random key changes. Much beyond McOE, cryptosystem designers could benefit from new tweak-agile tweakable block ciphers and new key-agile ordinary block ciphers.
It is mentionable that McOE-X, when using Threefish-512 in software, performs considerably better as when using software or even hardware AES-128. Note, Threefish-512 actually is a tweakable block cipher, but the 128-bit tweak is too short for McOE. As an alternative, we developed further variants of McOE using double encryption and Galois field arithmetic. These two variants also do not expose the underlying block cipher to related-key attacks.
Conclusion. Originally, this research has been inspired by the search for a default authenticated encryption mode of operation for a general-purpose cryptographic library. It should offer, by default, a huge failure tolerance for practical software developers and still allow being used in an on-line manner.
Since the well-known schemes, such as OCB and SIV, did not fit our requirements, we searched for other ways to achieve the security and functionality we were looking for. Apart from McOE, generic composition (Encrypt-then-Mac) of a secure on-line cipher for encryption and a secure deterministic MAC for authentication, using two independent keys might be another solution. As it turned out, using McOE, one can save the additional key and the time to generate the MAC by using a slightly tweaked on-line cipher for both encryption and authentication.
Mixed AE(AD) Modes: RPC [11] and CCFB [33] . RPC combines counter mode and electronic codebook mode. Given an n-bit block cipher E under a key K and a c-bit counter cnt, RPC takes an (n − c)-bit plaintext block M i and computes the ciphertext block C i := E K (M i ||(cnt + i) mod 2 c ). Authentication is performed locally for each ciphertext block: During decryption, RPC computes (M i ||X i ) = E ) with σ(i) ∈ {0, 1} is valid, since authenticity is verified locally for each C σ(i) i
